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The Flawed Implementation of the International 
Religious Freedom Act of 1998: 
A European Perspective 
Eugenia Relaño Pastor ∗
I. INTRODUCTION: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
Religious freedom has always been at the core of American life 
and public policy. As the first freedom enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights, religious freedom is a cornerstone of American liberty.1 Due 
to the importance of this liberty, religion has had a constant presence 
in U.S. foreign policy debates for the last fifty years.2 Just before the 
Second World War, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stressed the 
importance of religious liberty for all and identified guaranteeing this 
freedom as a compelling reason for Americans to join the struggle 
for freedom in Europe.3 Many of the United States’ concepts of 
religious freedom are also reflected in international law.4 Although 
 ∗ PhD, Assistant Law Professor in University Complutense (Madrid) and Legal 
Adviser to the Spanish Ombudsman. I would like to thank the Robbins Collection at Boalt 
Hall, University of California at Berkeley, for the support in writing this article. It is partly the 
result of a visiting scholar staying as Fellow of the Robbins Collection (July–October 2004). 
Thanks to Laurent Mayali for making this research possible. 
 1. See Fact Sheet, Office of International Religious Freedom, Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor (April 16, 2001), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/fs/2298.htm. 
 2. See Leo P. Ribuffo, Religion in the History of U.S. Foreign Policy, in THE INFLUENCE 
OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS GROUPS & U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1–27 (Eliot Abrams ed., 2001) 
(explaining the interaction between religion and foreign relations in the United States). 
 3. See M.E. Parmly, Religious Freedom Across the Atlantic: Developing the Habit of 
Cooperation (April 26, 2001), in REMARKS AT THE INSTITUTE OF RELIGION AND PUBLIC 
POLICY’S CONFERENCE ON TRANSATLANTIC CONVERSATIONS ON RELIGIOUS COEXISTENCE, 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2001/2486.htm. 
 4. The principle of religious freedom embedded in the U.S. Constitution has long 
been reflected in a body of international law that upholds freedom of thought, expression, and 
religion as inherent and inalienable human rights. The following are among these various 
international instruments securing as an inalienable right the freedom to exercise religious 
beliefs: Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); Article 18 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 52, U.N. GAOR, 
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966); Article 9 of the 
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the United States has a relatively modest record of ratifying 
international human rights treaties, it not surprisingly ratified three 
key international documents relating to religious freedom.5 The 
United States was also one of the original supporters of the 
resolution that created the Special Rapporteur of the Commission of 
Human Rights on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination based on Religion and Belief.6 Despite this apparent 
commitment to religious freedom, however, the United States’ 
recent efforts to protect such freedom abroad have fallen short, as 
illustrated by the compromised and ultimately problematic 
implementation of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 
(IRFA)7. While IRFA sets out to protect international religious 
freedom, its enforcement is undermined by the United States’ other 
foreign policy interests, such as the war on terrorism, and a decidedly 
unilateral approach to the achievement of religious liberty around 
the globe.  
This article contains five parts. Part II outlines the United States’ 
foreign policy commitments to international religious freedom and 
details the precedents of IRFA. Part III analyzes IRFA’s purpose and 
how it currently functions, describing each annual report since the 
first in 1999. The purpose of examining each report is to clearly 
 
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. 9 (Nov. 4, 1950); The Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief, G.A. Res. 6/55, at 
171, U.N. GAOR 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (Nov. 25, 1981); and the 
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, (Aug. 1, 1975). 
 5. See Natasha Fain, Human Rights Within the United States: The Erosion of Confidence, 
21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 607 (2003) (discussing the history of U.S. policy regarding human 
rights treaties). The three international documents ratified by the United States are the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), and the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief (DEIDRB). Further, the 
United States has supported efforts to advance religious freedom as a member of The 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE is the largest 
regional security organization in the world, with fifty-five participating States from Europe, 
Central Asia and North America. The OSCE began in 1975 as the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and was created to serve as a multilateral forum for dialogue 
and negotiations between European nations. In 1992, the name and the degree of 
institutionalization changed from an ad hoc process (a conference) to an organization. The 
OSCE has developed several monitoring mechanisms to protect religious freedom. The United 
States was admitted into the OSCE on June 23, 1975. 
 6. See David Weissbrodt, The Three Theme Special Rapporteurs of the UN Commission 
on Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 685, 695 (1986). 
 7. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6401–6581 (2000). 
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establish that actions taken under IRFA are triggered by the United 
States’ strategic and/or economic interests that do not typically 
correspond to severe violations of religious freedom occurring 
abroad. Part IV builds on this analysis and discusses the major flaws 
of IRFA that critics have identified, focusing heavily on the tendency 
of the United States to act unilaterally in its desire to promote 
worldwide religious liberty. Part V concludes the article by 
suggesting changes to rectify the bias and flaws in IRFA, which 
changes would subsequently enable the United States to fulfill its 
laudable goal of furthering religious freedom around the world. 
 
II. BACKGROUND: THE ORIGINS OF IRFA AND ITS FRAMEWORK 
FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT ABROAD 
The Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on Religious 
Freedom Abroad was established in November 1996.8 The advisory 
committee was empowered with responsibility to  
call attention to problems of religious persecution and other 
violations of religious freedom, and religious intolerance abroad 
and advise on how to end them; and to provide information on 
how to bring about reconciliation in areas of conflict, especially 
conflicts where religion is a factor, and promote respect for human 
rights so that religious freedom can be fully enjoyed.9
 8. This does not mean that the United States ignored the international protection of 
religious freedom until that date. Since 1976, the U.S. State Department has produced the 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, which provide human rights information, 
including religious freedom, on 194 countries and territories. In fact, sections on religious 
liberty have been broadened to include greater detail on religious persecution, incorporating 
information gathered from a variety of sources such as religious groups, non-governmental 
organizations, and other reliable groups. See Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom 
Abroad, INTERIM REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1998), http://www.usconsulate.org.hk/uscn/hr/1998/0123b.htm 
[hereinafter INTERIM REPORT] (released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 
Labor, Washington, D.C., on January 23, 1998). President Clinton strongly supported the 
initiative of creating an Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad and publicly 
affirmed his commitment to advance religious freedom as a U.S. foreign policy priority and as 
an issue of concern to his administration and to the American people. See id. at 32. 
 9. See id. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in her inaugural meeting with the 
Advisory Committee, stressed that the issue of religious freedom belongs in any comprehensive 
discussion of American foreign policy. She spoke of the urgency of “doing everything we can 
in our time to make sure that persecution everywhere is ended, because all of us have suffered 
from it and there are many more who might and will suffer from it if we do not work 
together.” Id. at 3.  
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 The advisory committee brought together twenty distinguished 
religious leaders and academics in an effort to address the diverse 
perspectives within the American religious community.10 During its 
first year, the committee focused on defining specific issues regarding 
religious freedom that needed to be addressed, elicited input from a 
wide range of experts, and prepared an interim report that outlined 
needed policies to promote the protection of religious freedom 
around the world by the United States government and multilateral 
organizations.11 According to the preliminary interim 
recommendations, one of the aims of U.S. foreign policy should be 
“to live up to the international standards of religious freedom” and 
to “promot[e] a broad international coalition of nations committed 
to the realization of religious freedom as an inseparable element of 
universal human rights.”12 The interim report mentioned “a wide 
variety of policy tools [that could] be applied to promote religious 
freedom,” including “incentives [that could be used to] induce 
governments to modify their behavior” in accordance with the 
interim report’s policy suggestions.13 The interim report, however, 
shied away from using negative inducements such as sanctions to 
induce appropriate government policies.14 Many of these ideas were 
adopted with the later implementation of IRFA.  
In 1996 the International Operations and Human Rights 
Subcommittee of the House of Representatives held hearings about 
 10. Id. at Appendix One, Charter of the Department of State Advisory Committee on 
Religious Freedom Abroad, III.A. 
 11. According to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
Governmental . . . policies aimed at protecting and expanding religious freedom 
were governed by four general guidelines. 
First, religious freedom is a universal human right. It deserves attention in its own 
right and not simply as an adjunct to political issues. 
Second, policy makers should strive for effective, results-oriented policies. . . .  
Third, the reactions and concerns of the local victims who are meant to be assisted 
by proposed policies should be fully understood and taken into account. . . .  
Fourth, religious freedom is often best protected in the context of a broad range of 
human rights objectives. . . . 
Id. at 16–18.  
 12. Id. at 18.  
 13. “Incentives can be as simple as diplomatic engagement or high-level visits or as 
complex as the provision of foreign assistance, trade and investment.” Id. at 18. 
 14. According to the INTERIM REPORT, “negative inducements or sanctions refers to a 
broad range of policies. The Committee has not yet had in-depth discussion on the use of 
sanctions to combat religious persecution. Because the term is so broad, it is not useful to 
make generalizations, favorable or unfavorable about sanctions.” Id. at 18–19. 
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the worldwide persecution of Christians and Jews.15 Following the 
hearings, Congress adopted resolutions on the persecution of 
Christians and Baha’is in Iran.16 The concern for the persecution of 
Christians continued to increase, however, and some members of 
Congress saw need for a law requiring the United States to act.17 
Virginia Congressman Frank Wolf and Pennsylvania Senator Arlen 
Specter, both Republicans, proposed the Freedom from Religious 
Persecution Act in May 1997.18 At the same time, media attention 
detailing the persecution of Christians worldwide increased public 
support for the bill,19 prompting an intense debate within the United 
States government and among religious groups, human rights 
organizations, and the public.20 The most controversial provision of 
the Wolf-Specter bill was its requirement that the United States 
automatically impose sanctions on countries found to be in violation 
of international religious freedom. Many critics feared that such a 
provision would cause more harm than good.21
 15. See Persecution of Christians Worldwide: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l 
Operations and Human Rights of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 104th Cong. (1996).  
 16. See T. Jeremy Gunn, A Preliminary Response to Criticisms of the International 
Religious Freedom Act, 2000 BYU L. REV. 841, 842. 
 17. Id. 
 18. H.R. 2431, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 19. See KEVIN BOYLE & JULIET SHEEN, FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A 
WORLD REPORT (1997); PAUL MARSHALL, THEIR BLOOD CRIES OUT: THE WORLDWIDE 
TRAGEDY OF MODERN CHRISTIANS WHO ARE DYING FOR THEIR FAITH (1997); NINA SHEA, 
IN THE LION’S DEN: A SHOCKING ACCOUNT OF PERSECUTION AND MARTYRDOM OF 
CHRISTIANS TODAY AND HOW WE SHOULD RESPOND (1997); J. Goldberg, Washington 
Discovers Christian Persecution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 21, 1997, at 46; L.J. Goodrich, 
Congress Moves to Punish Religious Persecution, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 25, 1997, at 3.  
 20. For criticisms of the bill by human rights organizations, see the letter sent by 
Human Rights Watch, Physicians for Human Rights, Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, 
Amnesty International/USA, the Robert F. Kennedy Center and the Jacob Blaustein Institute 
for the Advancement of Human Rights to Hon. Ben Gilman, Chairman, International 
Relations Committee. See 143 CONG. REC. E757, E1758 (Sept. 16, 1997). For criticisms of 
the bill by the National Council of the Churches of Christ in USA (NCCC), see the Letter to 
Congress on Legislation to address Religion Persecution from Oliver Thomas, NCCC Special 
Counsel, to Members of the House International Relations Committee, 143 CONG. REC. 
E1760, E1760-61 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1997), available at http://ncccusa.org/ 
assembly/letter.html. On the other hand, religious groups that have endorsed the Wolf-
Specter bill include Pat Robertson’s Virginia-based Christian Coalition, the U.S. Catholic 
Conference, the Archdiocese of New York, the National Association of Evangelicals and the 
Southern Baptist Convention. See Darin W. Carlson, Understanding Chinese-U.S Conflict over 
Freedom of Religion: The Wolf-Specter Freedom from Religious Persecution Acts of 1997 and 
1998, 1998 BYU L. REV. 563, 583. 
 21. One of the bill’s main critics was John Shattuck, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Shattuck saw the bill as “a blunt instrument that is 
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One opponent of the Wolf-Specter bill was Oklahoma 
Republican Senator Don Nickles, who feared that the required 
sanctions would lead to confrontations with countries found to be in 
violation of international religious freedom and that such 
confrontations could negatively impact indigenous Christians and 
Christian missionaries.22 Consequently, Senator Nickles introduced 
his own bill that required an investigation and annual report on 
violations of religious freedom in each foreign country.23
After conducting hearings in late 1997, the House International 
Relations Committee worked for six months to revise the original 
Wolf-Specter bill. An amended version of the bill was introduced in 
1998 as H.R. 2431.24 This amended version passed the House on 
May 14, 1998 as the “Freedom from Religious Persecution Act of 
1998” and was sent to the Senate. The Clinton Administration 
strongly opposed the proposed legislation because it believed the 
bill’s proposed mandatory sanctions would be counterproductive in 
convincing foreign governments to support religious freedom.25 The 
administration echoed Senator Nickles’ previous concern that the 
sanctions would eventually lead to repercussions against minority 
religious groups.26
By the summer of 1998, supporters of the two bills had joined 
forces. Senator Nickles introduced a significantly revised version of 
the bill, which merged together the concepts reflected in his own 
previous bill and the concepts found in the Wolf-Specter bill. The 
 
more likely to harm, rather than aid, victims of religious persecution.” Donna Cassata, Congress 
Enters Uncharted Territory with Bill on Religious Persecution, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2121, 2123. 
Shattuck stated that the administration feared reprisals against innocent civilians if sanctions 
were imposed under the legislation. Id.  
 22. Steven Wales, Comment, Remembering the Persecuted: An Analysis of the 
International Religious Freedom Act, 24 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 579, 589 (2002).  
 23. Id. 
 24. See T. Jeremy Gunn, The United States and the Promotion of Freedom of Religion and 
Belief, in FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF 843 (2004). 
 25. H.R. 2431 was objectionable to the administration because it felt the bill would (1) 
impose automatic sanctions that could harm religious minorities and bilateral relations with 
allies, as well as limit presidential flexibility and raise questions regarding U.S. international 
obligations; (2) undermine U.S. policy to respect all human rights; (3) unravel the current 
refugees admissions program; and (4) create a confusing bureaucracy to promote freedom of 
religion. See H.R. 2431, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 26. Id. 
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Senate unanimously adopted this revised version on October 9, 1998 
as the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.27
The various provisions of IRFA reflect a combination of the 
views of religious liberty held by politicians, human rights 
organizations, businessmen, and religious groups. Most of the 
domestic political pressure to enact IRFA came from conservative 
Christian and evangelical groups concerned with the persecution of 
Christians in countries such as China, Vietnam, and Sudan.28 
However, this issue of religious persecution divided conservatives: 
“social conservatives” wanted to protect global religious freedom 
while “economic conservatives” sought to protect global free trade.29 
IRFA’s primary opponents were business groups, the National 
Council of Churches,30 and the secular human rights community.31
Like Wolf-Specter, IRFA provides for the training of State 
Department and Justice Department personnel, as well as more 
extensive investigation and reporting of religious persecution. Rather 
than relying on a single entity to monitor religious persecution, 
IRFA uses three cooperative bodies: an Ambassador at Large for 
Religious Liberty, a Special Advisor on Religious Persecution, and 
the Commission on International Religious Liberty.32 Also, like the 
Wolf-Specter bill, IRFA replaces the Advisory Committee on 
Religious Freedom Abroad with a much smaller commission. 
 27. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. § 6401–6581 (2000). 
Although President Clinton signed the Act on October 27, 1998, he was troubled by the 
passages in IRFA that required him to take various actions. See Statement on Signing the 
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 34 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 2149 (Oct. 27, 
1998). 
 28. See Carlson, supra note 20, at 566; Christy McCormick, Exporting the First 
Amendment: America’s Response to Religious Persecution Abroad, 4 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 283, 
285–86 (1998).  
 29. See Wales, supra note 22, at 589. 
 30. The National Council of the Churches of Christ represents thirty-three Protestant 
and Orthodox denominations. They opposed the legislation because of the creation of a 
separate White House Office and the automatic sanctions. See Cassata, supra note 21, at 2123. 
Horowitz suggests the reason the National Council of Churches opposed the bills was because 
the bills were supported by evangelicals: “the antipathy to evangelicals was so strong that [the 
National Council of Churches] literally couldn’t bring themselves to participate in our 
coalition.” Michael Cromartie, The Jew Who is Saving Christians, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Mar. 
1, 1999, available at http://www.ctlibrary.com/ct/1999/mar1/9t3050.html. 
 31. Jeffrey Goldberg notes that Shea’s “faith-based human rights insurgency sees the 
liberal human rights establishment, especially Human Rights Watch, as its bete noire.” 
Goldberg, supra note 19, at 46ff. Beta noire is a person or thing that is particularly disliked. 
 32. H.R. 2431, 105th Cong. (1997). 
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Finally, IRFA includes additional measures to promote religious 
liberty. IRFA establishes religious liberty awards, creates funding for 
international broadcasting about religious liberty, and provides equal 
access to United States embassies and missions for religious 
activities.33
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The American System: A Closer Look at IRFA 
The U.S. Congress passed IRFA34 unanimously,35 and President 
Clinton signed it into law on October 27, 1998.36 The act requires 
the United States to incorporate concern for religious freedom 
directly into its foreign policy.37
IRFA begins by repeating the findings of Congress and then 
asserts that “the freedom of religion undergirds the very origin and 
existence of the United States.”38 Additionally, IRFA refers to 
international human rights instruments as the guiding norms by 
which the United States should act.39 In particular, the third finding 
of IRFA quotes two virtually identical articles of these international 
 33. Id.  
 34. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6401–6581 (2000). 
 35. The Senate voted 98–0 in favor of IRFA on October 9, 1998. U.S. Senate Roll Call 
Votes on H.R. 2431, 105th Cong. (1998) available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/ 
LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=105&session=2&vote=00310. The House 
of Representatives unanimously approved the Senate version of IRFA by voice the following 
day. See Peter G. Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism & the International Protection of Religious 
Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33, 50 (2002).  
 36. See U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes on H.R. 2431, 105th Cong. (1998) available at 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=105
&session=2&vote=00310; T. Jeremy Gunn, The United States and the Promotion of Freedom of 
Religion and Belief, in FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A DESKBOOK 721, 
721 (Tore Lindholm et al. eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004). 
 37. See Danchin, supra note 35, at 50.  
 38. 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(1). 
 39. See § 6401(a)(2). The international human rights instruments specifically mentioned 
by the second finding include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Helsinki Accords, the Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, the 
United Nations Charter, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. See id. The Department of State does not officially apply 
American standards on freedom of religion to others countries. Commentator Jeremy Gunn is 
“aware of no instance where the Department of State has suggested to a foreign government 
that it should implement a U.S. model; rather the benchmark is always presented as the 
language of the international instrument.” See Gunn, supra note 16, at 848. 
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texts: Article 18 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (HDHR) 
and Article 18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).40
The most important of IRFA’s five stated purposes are the 
condemnation of violations of religious freedom, the promotion of 
religious freedom at an early stage, and the implementation of 
appropriate tools in the United States foreign policy apparatus. Such 
tools include diplomatic, political, commercial, charitable, 
educational, and cultural channels for promotion of religious 
freedom and for respect of religious freedom by all governments and 
peoples.41
IRFA makes three important organizational contributions to the 
United States government. First, IRFA establishes an Office of 
International Religious Freedom within the State Department.42 
Second, IRFA establishes a nine-member Commission on 
International Religious Freedom,43 which reviews the annual report 
and makes “policy recommendations regarding international 
religious liberty to the president, the secretary of state, and 
Congress.”44 Third, IRFA creates a position in the National Security 
Council entitled Special Advisor to the President on International 
Religious Freedom.45
 40. It is difficult to understand why IRFA isolates one sub-article without mentioning 
the other pertinent sub-articles, especially without the legal restrictions of religious freedom 
(Article 18.3). See Dominique Decherf, Religious Freedom and Foreign Policy: The U.S. 
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, address at Harvard University (June 2001).  
 41. 22 U.S.C. § 6401(b)(1)–(5). 
 42. Id. § 6411(a). 
 43. Id. § 6431(a); see Leila Nadya Sadat, Religious Freedom and American Foreign 
Policy: The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 9 NEW ENG. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 1, 1–15 (2003) (describing the nine-member Commission on International 
Religious Freedom). The “Commission” referred to throughout the remainder of this Article is 
this Commission established by IRFA. 
 44. 22 U.S.C. § 6432(a). 
 45. Section 6402(12) of IRFA provides that “[t]he term ‘Special Adviser’ means the 
Special Adviser to the President on International Religious Freedom described in section 
101(i) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 301 of this Act [50 U.S.C. § 
402(i)].” 22 U.S.C. § 6402(12). Section 301 of Pub. L. 105-292 provides the following: 
Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402) is amended by 
adding at the end the following new subsection: (i) It is the sense of the Congress 
that there should be within the staff of the National Security Council a Special 
Adviser to the President on International Religious Freedom, whose position should 
be comparable to that of a director within the executive office of the president. The 
Special Adviser should serve as a resource for executive branch officials, compiling 
and maintaining information on the facts and circumstances of violations of religious 
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The Office of International Religious Freedom is headed by the 
Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom.46 The 
President appoints the ambassador-at-large,47 who then acts as “a 
principal adviser to the president and the secretary of state regarding 
matters affecting religious freedom abroad.”48 “The ambassador’s 
primary duty is the preparation of an annual report49 describing the 
status of religious freedom and the extension of violations of 
religious freedom in each foreign nation and what has been done or 
should be done to promote this freedom in places where it is 
lacking.”50 IRFA defines these “violations of religious freedom” as 
follows: 
 
“[V]iolations of religious freedom” are defined as “violations of the 
internationally recognized right to freedom of religion and belief 
and practice” and include simple violation such as arbitrary 
prohibition on, restrictions of, or punishment for (a) assembling for 
 
freedom (as defined in section 3 of the International Religious Freedom Act of 
1998), and making policy recommendations. The Special Adviser should serve as 
liaison with the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, the 
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Congress and, as 
advisable, religious nongovernmental organizations. 
50 U.S.C. § 402 (2000). As indicated, this language was adopted in a new 50 U.S.C. § 402(i); 
however, § 402 already had a sub-section (i), so this language is found in the second sub-
section (i), which follows sub-section (j). The sub-section (i) added by IRFA is referred to as 
either § 402(i) or § 402(k). 
 46. 22 U.S.C. § 6411(c)(2). 
 47. Id. In May 1999, Robert A. Seiple was sworn in as the first ambassador-at-large. See 
Briefing, Release of the 1999 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (Sept. 9, 
1999), http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990909_seiple_koh_irf.html.  
 48. 22 U.S.C. § 6411(c)(2) (2000). 
 49. The Annual Report contains the following information: 
(1) a description of the status of religious freedom in each foreign country, 
(2) an assessment and description of the nature and extent of violations of religious 
freedom in each foreign country, 
(3) a description of United States actions and policies in support of religious 
freedom in each foreign country engaging in or tolerating violations of religious 
freedom, 
(4) a description of any binding agreement with a foreign government entered into 
by the United States under [IRFA], and 
(5) a description of [refugee-related or asylum-related guidelines and the training 
provided to various government officials]. 
See id. § 6412(b)(1). 
 50. See Wales, supra note 22, at 593 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6411(c)(1)). By statute, the 
ambassador is expected to work in conjunction with the Secretary of State in creating the 
annual report, and the report must “tak[e] into consideration the recommendations of the 
Commission [on International Religious Freedom].” 22 U.S.C. § 6412(b)(1). 
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peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, and prayer, 
including arbitrary registration requirements; (b) speaking freely 
about one’s religious beliefs; (c) changing one’s religious beliefs 
and affiliation; (d) possession and distribution of religious 
literature, including Bibles; or (e) raising one’s children in the 
religious teaching and practices of one’s choices. The term 
“particularly severe violations” of religious freedom means 
systematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom.51 
 
When an annual report determines that a country is in violation 
of religious freedom, IRFA requires presidential action.52 The 
President has three options: take one or more of fifteen enumerated 
actions,53 take a commensurate action,54 or enter into a binding 
 51. 22 U.S.C. § 6402(11). “‘Particularly severe violations’ of religious freedom” 
includes violations such as the following: “(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment; (B) prolonged detention without charges; (C) causing the 
disappearance of persons by abduction or clandestine detention of those persons; or (D) other 
flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons.” Id. “The term ‘violations 
of religious freedom’ means violations of the internationally recognized right to freedom of 
religion and religious beliefs and practice, as set forth in the international instruments referred 
to in § 6401(a) (2) of this title and as described in § 6401(a)(3).” Id. § 6402(13); see also id. § 
6402(13) (providing more meanings of the term “violations”); id. § 6402(11). 
 52. See id. § 6441(a)(1)(B), (b)(1) (violations of religious freedom); id. § 
6442(a)(1)(B), (c)(1)–(2) (particularly severe violations of religious freedom). However, the 
President may grant a waiver under certain circumstances “if the President determines and so 
reports to the appropriate congressional committees that (1) the respective foreign government 
has ceased the violations giving rise to the Presidential action; (2) the exercise of such waiver 
authority would further the purposes of this Chapter; or (3) the important national interest of 
the United States requires the exercise of such waiver authority.” Id. § 6447. 
 53. See id. § 6441(a)(1)(B) (presidential action required for violations); id. § 
6442(c)(1)(A) (presidential action required for particularly severe violations). The enumerated 
actions are: 
(1) A private demarche; (2) an official public demarche; (3) a public condemnation; 
(4) a public condemnation within one or more multilateral fora; (5) the delay or 
cancellation of one or more scientific exchanges; (6) the delay or cancellation of one 
or more cultural exchanges; (7) the denial of one or more working, official, or state 
visits; (8) the delay or cancellation of one or more working, official or state visits; (9) 
the withdrawal, limitation or suspension of United States development assistance in 
accordance with section 116 of [the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961]; (10) directing 
the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, or the Trade and Development Agency not to approve the issuance of 
. . . guarantees, insurance, extensions of credit, or participations in the extension of 
credit . . . ; (11) the withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States security 
assistance in accordance with section 502B of [the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961]; 
(12) consistent with section 701 of [the International Financial Institutions Act of 
1977], directing the United States executive directors of international financial 
institutions to oppose and vote against [specified] loans . . . ; (13) ordering the 
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agreement with the government of the country found in violation of 
religious freedom.55 The President has some discretion as to which 
action to take; however, the President does not have “the discretion 
not to act.”56 The President, in choosing what action to take, must 
consider “the nature and severity of the violations of religious 
freedom.”57 IRFA also requires that he “target action as narrowly as 
practicable with respect to the [entity] responsible for such 
violations” and pursue entrance into a binding agreement with the 
violating country.58
When the President determines that “the government of a 
foreign country has engaged in or tolerated particularly severe 
violations of religious freedom,” the President designates that 
 
heads of the appropriate United States agencies not to issue any . . . specific licenses, 
and not to grant any other specific authority . . . to export any goods or technology 
to the specific foreign government . . . ; (14) prohibition [of] any United States 
financial institution from making loans or providing credits totaling more than 
$10,000,000 in any 12-month period to the specific foreign government . . .; (15) 
prohibiting the United States Government from procuring or entering into any 
contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from the foreign government 
. . . . 
Id. § 6445(a). 
 54. See id. § 6402(4); id. § 6441(b)(1)(A) (violations); id. § 6442(c)(1)(B) (particularly 
severe violations); id. § 6445(b). “[C]ommensurate action” means actions taken by the 
President under section 6445(b) of this title.” Id. § 6402(4). This section states that the 
President may substitute any other action authorized by law to obtain the cessation of the 
violations for any action described in paragraphs (1) through (15) of subsection (a) of this 
section if such action is commensurate in effect to the action substituted and if the action 
would further the policy of the United States. See id. § 6445(b). If commensurate action is 
taken, the President shall report such action, together with an explanation for taking such 
action, to the appropriate congressional committees. Id.  
 55. See id. § 6441(b)(1)(B) (violations); id. § 6442(c)(2) (particularly severe violations); 
id. § 6445(c). 
The President may negotiate and enter into a binding agreement with a foreign 
government that obligates such government to cease, or take substantial steps to 
address and phase out, the act, policy, or practice constituting the violation of 
religious freedom. The entry into force of a binding agreement for the cessation of 
the violations shall be the primary objective for the President . . . . 
Id. § 6445(c). IRFA also points out that the President shall make every reasonable effort to 
conclude a binding agreement in countries with which the United States has diplomatic 
relations. 
 56. Wales, supra note 22, at 594. In fact, IRFA states the requirement of presidential 
action: “Whenever the President determines that the government of a foreign country has 
engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom, the President shall 
oppose such violations and promote the right to religious freedom through one or more of the 
actions described in subsection (c).” 22 U.S.C. § 6442(a)(2). 
 57. 22 U.S.C. § 6441(c)(1)(A). 
 58. Id. § 6441(c)(1)(B)–(C). 
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country “as a country of particular concern for religious freedom.”59 
The President’s options in responding to these countries of particular 
concern (CPCs), are more limited and more specifically prescribed 
than are his options when dealing with countries that have merely 
violated religious freedom. Specifically, in cases of CPCs, the 
President must take at least one of the last seven enumerated actions 
under IRFA,60 take a commensurate action, or enter into a binding 
agreement with the CPC.61
After designating a country as a CPC but before taking 
presidential action, the President must “request [a] consultation with 
the [CPC] regarding the violations giving rise to designation of that 
country as [a CPC].”62 Furthermore, if the President determines it to 
be appropriate, such consultations may occur in a multilateral forum. 
For such a multi-lateral form, the President must consult with 
members of the international community, including appropriate 
foreign governments, to achieve a coordinated international policy 
with respect to the CPC.63 Humanitarian and religious organizations 
also must be consulted to assess the social impact of U.S. policies on 
the promotion of religious freedom in the CPC.64 Finally, interested 
U.S. parties are to be consulted about the potential impact such 
action may have upon other homeland interests.65 This provision is 
critical since the President can waive punitive economic measures if 
the violating nation has remedied the abuses of religious liberty 
within its borders or if it is in the “important national interest of the 
United States” to do so.66 Therefore, an “important national 
 59. Id. § 6442(a)(2)–(b)(1)(A). The description of particularly severe violations targets 
the most horrendous offenses—those the statute calls “systematic, ongoing, egregious 
violations of religious freedom.” Id. § 6402(11). 
 60. Id. § 6441(a)(1)(B). See actions (9)–(15), supra note 53.  
 61. Id. § 6442(c) (limiting presidential action to options (9)–(15) in 22 U.S.C. § 
6445(a)). 
 62. Id. § 6443(b)(1)(A). The President, prior to taking any presidential actions, shall 
request consultation with the government of such country regarding the violations giving rise 
to designation of that country as CPC. Id. These consultations may occur privately or publicly 
and may also occur in a multilateral forum. See Nichol J. Starr, Who Asked You?: The 
Appropriateness of U.S. Leadership in Promoting Religious Freedom Worldwide, 33 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 987, 1005 (2000). 
 63. 22 U.S.C. § 6443(b). The appropriate foreign governments are those more suitable 
for the purposes of achieving a coordinated international policy on actions that may be taken 
with respect to that country. See id. § 6443(b)(2). 
 64. See id. § 6443(c).  
 65. See id. § 6443(d). 
 66. Id. § 6447(a)(3). 
7RELANO.FIN 9/13/2005 3:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
724 
                                                
interest” at the very core of foreign policy can prevent the U.S. 
government from acting against even severe international religious 
freedom violations. Also, according to this language of IRFA, the 
United States is permitted to overlook severe “religious violations 
when other relationships, such as trade, are deemed to be more 
beneficial.”67
After consulting with the various parties and organizations, “the 
president must submit a report to Congress, detailing . . . the 
violations, the violators, and the actions to be taken.”68 The report 
must confirm that all “noneconomic policy options designed to 
bring about cessation of the particularly severe violations of religious 
freedom have reasonably been exhausted.”69
B. The Annual Report 
A major feature of IRFA is the requirement of an annual report 
detailing the condition of religious freedom in each country around 
the world. Section 6412 of IRFA requires the Secretary of State, 
“with the assistance of the Ambassador at Large, and taking into 
consideration the recommendations of the Commission,” to prepare 
and submit to Congress an annual report on the state of religious 
freedom worldwide.70 The State Department has submitted an 
annual report every year since 1999. In accordance with IRFA, the 
reports describe the “status of religious freedom in each foreign 
country” and list particular violations of religious freedom.71 The 
reports also include an Executive Summary describing actions taken 
by the United States to foster international religious freedom during 
the previous year.72
The Commission has an important role in the preparation of the 
annual reports: it is responsible for the annual and ongoing review of 
the facts and circumstances of religious freedom violations presented 
in the annual reports. The Commission has recommended a variety 
of policy tools for the President’s consideration since he is required 
by IRFA to oppose religious freedom violations based upon the 
Commission’s findings and recommendations. 
 67. Starr, supra note 62, at 1008. 
 68. Wales, supra note 22, at 596; see 22 U.S.C. § 6444(a)(5). 
 69. 22 U.S.C. § 6444(a)(5).  
 70. Id. § 6412(b)(1). 
 71. Id. § 6412(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
 72. See id. § 6412(b)(1)(F); see also Danchin, supra note 35, at 58–59.  
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The reports give notice of religious freedom violations abroad 
and offer possible responses to those violations. However, responsive 
action by the United States is still necessary for the reports to 
ultimately prove effective in combating religious persecution. 
Inaction by the United States renders the reports and suggestions 
contained therein futile. A review of the reports and subsequent 
action, or lack thereof, since 1999 will demonstrate the United 
States’ unfortunately consistent pattern of neglecting to fully enforce 
principles of religious freedom abroad if the violating nations possess 
economic or strategic value for the United States. Where a violating 
nation can potentially be mined for some other benefit, the United 
States generally turns a blind eye to violations of religious liberty.  
1. 1999 Annual Report 
The State Department released its first Annual Report on 
Religious Freedom almost a full year after IRFA was passed.73 The 
approximately one-thousand-page report evaluates 194 countries.74 
The report’s executive summary specifies five categories of nations 
prone to religious persecution: (1) totalitarian or authoritarian 
nations that attempt to control religious belief or practice;75 (2) 
nations that are hostile to minority or non-approved religions;76 (3) 
nations that neglect or ignore discrimination against or persecution 
of minority or unapproved religions;77 (4) nations with policies or 
legislation disadvantaging certain religions;78 and (5) democratic 
nations that discriminate by identifying minority religions as “sects” 
or “cults.”79 This summary described the possible range of 
discrimination with which IRFA should be concerned and 
established a classification system for subsequent reports.80
 73. Briefing, supra note 42.  
 74. See Wales, supra note 22, at 599.  
 75. Examples of such regimes include Afghanistan, Burma, China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and 
Vietnam. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM FOR 1999, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1999), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/1999/irf_exec99.html [hereinafter 1999 EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY]; see also Wales, supra note 22, at 600.  
 76. Such nations included Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, and Sudan. See 1999 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 75.  
 77. Uzbekistan, Egypt, India, and Indonesia. See id. 
 78. Russia and Turkey. See id. 
 79. Belgium, France, and Germany. See id. 
 80. See Wales, supra note 22, at 600. 
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The inaugural report itself did not identify any nations as 
countries of particular concern (CPCs), but the State Department 
released a report a week after the release of the annual report 
designating five countries as CPCs: China, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and 
Burma.81 The State Department report also listed the government of 
Serbia and the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, though not 
actually sovereign states, as “particularly severe violators of religious 
freedom.”82  
Despite these concerns, a number of obvious violators of 
religious liberty were absent from both the annual report and the 
State Department’s report. The U.S. Commission on International 
Religious Freedom had previously focused its report on three 
particular violators: China, Russia and Sudan; yet Russia was 
conspicuously absent from the State Department’s official report. 
Also noticeably missing from the 1999 list of CPCs were nations 
with “[t]otalitarian . . . regimes . . . [that] seek to control thought 
and expression,” namely Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam.83 Other countries 
with particularly troubling religious rights records absent from the 
list of CPCs were Saudi Arabia,84 Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.85
The 1999 annual report did not list any specific actions taken by 
the President, but it did recite some of the actions taken by various 
other United States officials and agencies.86 The majority of these 
actions involved U.S. officials speaking with officials of other nations 
to facilitate cooperation between the United States and those 
nations: “No less important is the tone and context set by senior 
[United States] officials when they speak publicly on the subject of 
religious freedom, or privately with foreign heads of government and 
other policy makers.”87 No sanctions were suggested or imposed on 
 81. See id. at 609. 
 82. Id. (quoting State Department Lists 5 Nations as Violators of Religious Freedom, 
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1999, at A15).  
 83. See 1999 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 75. 
 84. Many consider Saudi Arabia to be “the most oppressive of all Muslim countries in 
the world.” McCormick, supra note 28, at 306–07 (detailing the substantial religious liberty 
violations that occur within Saudi Arabia).  
 85. See Danchin, supra note 35, at 113. Danchin asserts that these countries are not 
listed as CPCs because they are “of obvious economic and strategic importance to the United 
States.” Id. 
 86. See 1999 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 75. 
 87. See id. 
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any nation according to the 1999 annual report.88 All things 
considered, the 1999 annual report revealed a somewhat lackluster 
beginning for IRFA; unfortunately, the situation has not improved 
with time. 
2. 2000 Annual Report 
Before the report’s publication, the Commission recommended 
that each country on the original list of CPCs remain on the list.89 
Following the basic structure of the 1999 report, the Executive 
Summary of the 2000 annual report separated countries into the 
same five categories as the 1999 annual report. Although the 2000 
annual report did recategorize some countries from the previous 
year,90 there were no major changes. The report included a section 
detailing the improvements achieved during the previous year.91 
Disappointingly, and despite ample evidence that other nations had 
met the statutory threshold to be designated as CPCs, no additional 
countries were listed alongside China, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and Burma 
in 2000.92 Furthermore, no additional sanctions had been levied 
against violators of religious freedom.93 
 88. See Wales, supra note 22, at 609.  
 89. See U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2001 Report of the 
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 20 (May 1, 2001), available at 
http://uscirf.gov/countries/publications/currentreport/2001annRpt.pdf. 
 90. For example, Iran and Iraq changed from countries where totalitarian regimes seek 
to control religious belief to countries where the state is hostile to minority religions. Compare 
1999 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 75, with U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2000 ANNUAL 
REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Sept. 5. 2000), 
available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/irf_exec.html 
[hereinafter 2000 REPORT]. 
 91. The report cites Azerbaijan and Laos as being countries where significant 
improvements had occurred. “Noteworthy” improvements also occurred in other countries. 
See id.; see also Wales, supra note 22, at 613. The Commission noted that the reporting of such 
“improvements” must be carefully handled in order to avoid misrepresentation of the 
conditions of religious freedom. See 2001 Report of the United States Commission on 
International Religious Freedom, supra note 89. 
 92. See 2001 Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 
supra note 89. 
 93. See Wales, supra note 22, at 615. In September 2000, following the redesignation of 
Burma, China, Iran, Iraq and Sudan as CPCs, the State Department reported in a letter to the 
U.S. Congress that the Secretary had decided to take no action with respect to these countries 
since the action taken the previous year for each of the countries in question was still in effect. 
See 2001 Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, supra note 
89. 
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“[I]t is instructive to consider the actions that have been actually 
taken under [IRFA] against five countries that were designated by 
the Secretary of State in 1999 and 2000 as being of ‘particular 
concern’ and against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.”94 Nowhere 
in the 2000 annual report does the State Department mention the 
sanctions it could have imposed as a result of a country’s designation 
as a CPC. Indeed, the United States’ actions under IRFA have been 
limited to expressions of criticism, or at most, to special visits to the 
regions in question.95 A review of the 2000 annual report confirms 
this assessment and reveals that U.S. policies and actions do not 
reflect the gravity of the situation in several key countries where 
significant religious freedom violations occur.  
For example, regarding violence between Christians and Muslims 
in Indonesia, the report states that “President Clinton and other 
senior government officials raised concerns with their Indonesian 
counterparts on numerous occasions.”96 Similarly, with respect to 
Saudi Arabia, “On March 5 embassy officers conducted a meeting 
with and delivered a demarche on religious freedom to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs official in charge of human rights, including 
freedom of religion.”97 Such meetings and criticisms—little more 
than advice to the offending nations—represented the most 
aggressive actions taken by the United States on behalf of religious 
freedom abroad. 
The chairman of the House Subcommittee on International and 
Human Rights, Christopher H. Smith, criticized the 2000 annual 
report because “the Administration would not name any additional 
nations to the list of CPCs in spite of abundant evidence of severe 
violations.”98 Similarly, the Human Rights Watch argued that 
 94. Danchin, supra note 35, at 59. 
 95. See id. at 60–61. 
 96. 2000 REPORT, supra note 90. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Wales, supra note 22, at 616; see also State Department Annual Report on 
International Religious Freedom for 2000: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations and 
Human Rights of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 106th Cong. 48–50 (2000). The 
Commission was very disappointed that the Secretary of State did not name Laos, the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan as CPCs. In 
addition to these four countries, the Commission advised the Secretary of State that another 
four governments are close to earning the CPC label for their countries: India, Pakistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. See 2001 Report of the United States Commission on International 
Religious Freedom, supra note 89. 
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Uzbekistan should have been designated as a CPC.99 The 
Commission itself criticized the report for not implementing all of its 
recommendations.100 Dr. Firuz Kazemzadeh, vice chairman of the 
Commission, levied several criticisms, including the need for context 
in country reports, the problem of significant omissions in the 
report, the lack of new additions to the list of CPCs, and the 
handling of sanctions by the State Department.101 He also noted that 
“the 2000 Report described many countries where the status of 
religious freedom had worsened,” but State Department policies 
toward those countries did not adjust accordingly.102
Finally, the 2000 annual report added something new—a section 
entitled in part “Improvements in Respect for Religious Freedom,” 
which catalogued certain improvements in religious freedom that 
had been significant and others that were noteworthy. With this new 
section, the State Department tried to maintain consistency with the 
approach that IRFA should take; namely, it should focus on the 
promotion of religious freedom rather than focus on punishment.103
3. 2001 Annual Report 
Prior to the release of the 2001 report, the Commission 
recommended that the State Department name ten nations as 
CPCs.104 Sudan, in particular, received special emphasis due to its 
record of religious freedom violations.105 After conducting hearings 
on Sudan, the Commission recommended “unprecedented . . . 
market sanctions to stop American investors from . . . funding a 
war.”106 The Commission included these sanctions in the Sudan 
Peace Act.107 Shortly after the September 11th attacks, however, the 
Sudan Peace Act abruptly died in spite of the Commission’s protests. 
 99. See Wales, supra note 22, at 617. 
 100. See id. at 618–19.  
 101. See id. at 619.  
 102. Id. at 620. Examples include Turkmenistan, China, and France. Id. at 621. 
 103. See 2000 REPORT, supra note 90. 
 104. Wales, supra note 22, at 622. The ten suggested nations were the Taliban of 
Afghanistan, Myanmar, China, Iran, Iraq, Laos, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, and 
Sudan. Id. 
 105. See id. at 622–23.  
 106. Id. at 623.  
 107. Id. at 624. See Press Release, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 
Commission Issues New Recommendations on Sudan (Mar. 21, 2001) 
http://www.uscirf.gov/mediaroom/press/2001/march/03212001%5Fcommission.html. 
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A possible explanation for the act’s sudden demise is suggested 
when, referring to the war on terrorism, a member of the 
Commission declared, “Sudan must be seen as [an] essential piece of 
the puzzle.”108 In the post-9/11 war against terrorism, Sudan’s 
newfound value as an ally afforded it a measure of immunity as to its 
severe religious freedom violations, thereby allowing it to evade 
sanctions that would have otherwise likely been levied.  
The 2001 report adhered to the same format as the two previous 
years’ reports: violators of religious freedom were divided into the 
same five categories, positive developments were cited, and the 
United States’ actions to promote religious freedom were 
described.109 One major change in the 2001 report was North 
Korea’s inclusion as a CPC for the first time.110 Other countries that 
were among the ten identified by the Commission—Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—escaped the CPC 
designation because of their alliance with the United States in the 
war on terror. Instead, these nations were listed in a lesser category 
identifying nations that are “hostile to certain minority religions.”111
The omission of countries so blatantly violating religious 
freedom from CPC designation provoked several reactions: “The 
State Department was accused of sparing anti-terrorism allies such as 
Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,”112 and Human Rights 
Watch noted that the three countries were part of the United States’ 
coalition against terrorism and were hosts of United States military 
bases.113 In addition, the new chairman of the Commission, Michael 
Young, expressed his own concerns. “If we abandon our values [such 
as the commitment to religious freedom] to fight this battle, the 
terrorists will already have won.”114
 108. See id. (citing Jim Lobe, Officials Say Sudan Moving Quickly to Cooperate, 
INTERPRESS SERVICE, Sept. 20, 2001).
 109. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT FOR 
2001, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, (Dec. 2001) available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ 
irf/2001/5531.htm [hereinafter 2001 Report]. 
 110. See Wales, supra note 22, at 635.  
 111. See id. at 635–36. 
 112. Id. at 638 (quoting Steven Mutson, U.S. Cites 6 Nations in Report on Religious 
Intolerance, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2001, at A28).  
 113. See Danchin, supra note 35, at 61. Danchin also states that a “review of the actions 
taken under [IRFA] towards other countries in which the United States has important strategic 
or military interests reveal[ed] that despite ‛widespread violations of religious freedom,’ the 
Report only recommended diplomatic caution.” Id. at 61–62. 
 114. See Wales, supra note 22, at 639.  
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Scholars drew interesting preliminary conclusions after the 
release of the first three annual reports—the primary, and most 
scathing, conclusion being that the actions taken under IRFA 
depend primarily on the United States’ strategic or economic 
interests rather than on the severe violations of religious freedom. 
Hence, to the degree significant U.S. security and strategic interests 
are reliant on offending nations, the less likely it is that substantive 
actions will be taken under IRFA.115  
Additionally, the first three reports all identified various nations 
as severe violators of religious freedom but failed to designate them 
as CPCs. Instead of receiving sanctions, those countries were 
beneficiaries of training, educational and exchange cooperation, and 
support.116
4. 2002 Annual Report 
In the introduction to the 2002 annual report, the State 
Department offered four reasons for the United States to promote 
religious freedom.117 The fourth reason states that the United States’ 
“religious freedom policy is a means of fighting the war on terrorism. 
 115. Danchin explains:  
First, where relatively minor U.S. strategic or economic interests are at stake, 
economic sanctions and harsher punitive measures are more likely than not to be 
imposed, as has been the case with Burma. Second, where more significant U.S. 
economic interests but fewer strategic concerns are at stake, political or diplomatic 
foreign policy tools are more likely to be employed . . . as has been the case with 
Indonesia and China. Third, where both greater U.S. strategic and economic 
interests are at stake, little substantive action will be taken under IRFA other than at 
the level of rhetoric, as has been the case with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel. . . . 
Fourth, in the case of countries considered to be “rogue states” . . . (and where 
strategic and economic interests may also be involved), the wider and shifting 
concerns of U.S. foreign policy will be paramount, as has been the case with Iran, 
Iraq, North Korea, and Sudan.  
Danchin, supra note 35, at 62–63. 
 116. In October 2002, President Bush signed legislation lifting the existing sanctions 
against Pakistan as a reward for its support of the U.S. military campaign against terrorism. 
Regarding Israel, the reports discuss the issue of religious freedom in the occupied territories 
separately. In relation to Indonesia and Egypt, the reports indicate a range of diplomatic, 
training, educational and exchange activities between the U.S. and these countries. Saudi 
Arabia, which has long been a key ally of the U.S. as an oil exporter and as host of military 
bases available to the United States in the region, remains the top buyer of U.S. arms exports 
among developing countries. See Human Rights in Saudi Arabia: A Deafening Silence, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH BACKGROUNDER 1 (Dec. 2001). 
 117. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2002 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, 
INTRODUCTION (2002) available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/ 2002/13607.htm 
[hereinafter 2002 INTRODUCTION]. 
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The events of September 11, 2001 have had significant implications 
for that policy.”118 Interestingly, none of the previous reports had 
advanced such a rationale for promoting religious freedom. This new 
addition to the introduction demonstrated one of the ways in which 
the events of September 11th had changed U.S. foreign policy. 
The executive summary of the 2002 report followed the same 
format as in previous years, beginning with a description of the five 
categories of governments that permit religious persecution.119 It 
redesignated Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Sudan as 
CPCs.120 The most drastic actions taken by the U.S. Government 
during the previous year as explained in the 2002 report were 
economic actions imposed against Burma.121 Per usual procedure, 
actions taken against other CPC countries were limited to U.S. 
officials meeting with various leaders, giving speeches, and collecting 
data.122 Those countries again avoided any substantial financial, 
economic, or diplomatic actions. 
The policies described in the 2002 report ignited as much debate 
as the previous reports for not designating certain violating 
countries, such as Turkmenistan, as CPCs.123 One author described 
the severe violations of religious freedom occurring in Turkmenistan 
as particularly harrowing. “[O]fficials have arrested and tortured 
members of minority religious groups [and have] . . . engaged in and 
tolerated gross violations of religious freedom such as rape, severe 
 118. Id. 
 119. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.  
 120. See 2002 INTRODUCTION, supra note 117. 
 121. See id. 
The United States has discontinued bilateral aid to the Government, suspended 
issuance of licenses to export arms to the country, and suspended the generalized 
system of preferences and Export-Import Bank financial services in support of U.S. 
exports to the country. The U.S. Government also has suspended all Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) financial services in support of U.S. 
investment in the country, ended active promotion of trade with the country, and 
halted issuance of visas to high government officials and their immediate family 
members. It also has . . . opposed all assistance to the Government by international 
financial institutions, and urged the governments of other countries to take similar 
actions. 
Id.  
 122. See id. 
 123. See, e.g., Juan E. Mendez, Human Rights Policy in the Age of Terrorism, 46 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 377 (2002); John Shattuck, Religion, Rights, and Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 183 (2003). 
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beatings, imprisonment, and forced deportation.”124 The United 
States’ justification for not labeling Turkmenistan as a CPC “points 
to a flaw in the United States foreign policy: namely, the United 
States favors actual and potential anti-terrorism allies at the expense 
of human rights and religious freedom.”125 Despite its gross 
violations of religious freedom, Turkmenistan was an important ally 
in the war on terrorism and consequently escaped U.S. action under 
IRFA.126 The United States also failed to designate important allies 
Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan as CPCs, despite the egregious 
violations of religious freedom perpetrated within their borders.127 
According to critics, the failure of the United States government to 
designate such countries as CPCs “reduce[d] the effectiveness of 
United States efforts to promote such religious freedom.”128
5. 2003 Annual Report 
The 2003 report details two unique situations: the disturbing 
increase in anti-Semitism in several European countries and the 
changing situation in Iraq.129 The U.S. Secretary of State designated 
Iraq as a CPC “due to the Saddam Hussein Government’s severe 
violations of religious freedom,” just as it did in 1999, 2000, and 
2001.130 However, since Operation Iraqi Freedom began on April 9, 
2003, and since the establishment of the Coalition of Provisional 
Authority in May 2003, a government more tolerant of all religions 
and ethnicities had begun to develop.131
 124. Christina M. Kelly, The United States and Turkmenistan: Striking a Balance Between 
Promoting Religious Freedom and Fighting the War Against Terrorism, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV. 
481, 507 (2003). 
 125. Id. The Commission, concerned about this fact, urged the U.S. Government to 
promote religious freedom as an integral part of the war on terrorism. Its recommendations on 
Afghanistan and the worldwide effort to fight terrorism have played an important role in 
shaping U.S. policy. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2002), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13608.htm [hereinafter 2002 REPORT]. 
 126. Kelly, supra note 124, at 508; see Wales, supra note 22, at 638. 
 127. See Wales, supra note 22, at 638. 
 128. Kelly, supra note 124, at 507.  
 129. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2003 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/ 
2003/27185.htm [hereinafter 2003 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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The report described the principle barriers to international 
religious freedom using the same five categories as the previous 
reports. It redesignated six countries as CPCs—Burma, China, Iran, 
Iraq, North Korea, and Sudan132—but failed to add any new 
countries to the CPC list. The Commission had unsuccessfully 
recommended that each of those countries remain listed and that 
India, Laos, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, and Vietnam be 
added.133 Those recommendations, however, went unheeded. 
Further, the United States’ actions to promote international religious 
freedom did not include any economic or financial action against 
two of the main violators of religious freedom—China and Sudan.134 
For the fourth consecutive year, the United States suspended trade 
and investments in Burma, making it the only nation to consistently 
feel any actual effect of the United States’ efforts to promote 
religious freedom.135
As in the introduction to the 2002 report, the 2003 report 
highlighted the special importance of religious freedom in the wake 
of the September 11th attacks: “Promoting religious freedom is of 
special importance in the ongoing war against terrorism. All too 
often, countries that violate religious liberty also contribute to 
terrorism, intentionally or unintentionally.”136 Ambassador at Large 
John Hanford further noted in the release of the 2003 annual report 
that “[i]n some cases, those governments that are hostile to religious 
liberty have also been hospitable to terrorism.”137
The United States has tried to clarify in the last two reports that 
expanding religious freedom is a tool the administration plans to use 
to fight terrorism.138 The United States views religion—in its best 
 132. Unfortunately, in the report on Sudan there continues to be no mention of the role 
of oil development in the government’s previous policies of forced displacement of people 
from oil areas. Id.  
 133. See 2003 Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious 
Freedom (May 2003), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/publications/ 
currentreport/finalReport050203.pdf. 
 134. See 2003 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 129. 
 135. See id. 
 136. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2003 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, 
INTRODUCTION (Dec. 18, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/ 
27183.htm [hereinafter 2003 INTRODUCTION].  
 137. Id. 
 138. President Bush has stated that “Religious freedom reinforces the development and 
strength of civil societies, and it dampens the appeal of religious extremism and religion-based 
terrorism.” See 2003 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 129. 
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form—as an antidote to terrorism rather than its cause.139 Finally, the 
2003 report used the same language to address the relation between 
religion and terrorism as the 2002 report had used; in fact, the 
executive summaries of the two reports are virtually identical. In the 
absence of significant changes, the 2003 report is susceptible to the 
many of the same criticisms levied against the 2002 report, including 
that Saudi Arabia—where the report stated religious freedom is 
nonexistent—was not included in the CPC category140 and that there 
continued to be a lack of stronger actions taken against China.141
6. 2004 Annual Report 
The 2004 report mirrored earlier reports in many ways. First, the 
introduction reiterated that the promotion of religious freedom is an 
important tool in the ongoing fight against terrorism.142 Second, the 
executive summary is divided into three main parts: a classification of 
the policies and actions of countries that restrict religious freedom, a 
list of countries that have “taken significant steps to promote or 
protect religious freedom,” and a list of U.S. actions to promote 
religious freedom.143
There are two significant differences, however, between the 2004 
report and its predecessors. First, the 2004 report omits Iraq as a 
 139. See id; see also L. Davidson, Allies’ Stand on Religion Questioned, DESERET NEWS, 
Nov. 27, 2001, at A1. 
 140. In March 2003, the Secretary of State failed to designate Saudi Arabia as a CPC. 
When asked why, State Department Spokesman Boucher said, 
There is no religious freedom in Saudi Arabia. It’s a country that, based on the 
guidelines in the law, came very close to the threshold of being listed. However, it 
was the recommendation of all the experts involved in the government that we 
continue the same listing as last year and that we look for ways of working with the 
Saudi Government to try to take advantage of any opportunities there might be to 
improve the state of religious freedom in Saudi Arabia. 
2003 Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, supra 
note 133. 
 141. The Commission repeatedly has criticized the U.S. Government for not taking 
enough action against China. In its 2003 annual report, the Commission objected to the 
United States not choosing to introduce a resolution condemning the Chinese government’s 
violations of religious freedom and other human rights at the 2003 session of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights. See id. 
 142. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2004 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, 
INTRODUCTION (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/ 
35337.htm [hereinafter 2004 INTRODUCTION] (“[S]trategies to promote religious freedom 
. . . further[] the war against terrorism.”). 
 143. Id. 
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CPC.144 Perhaps more importantly, after years of criticism, the 2004 
report finally designated Saudi Arabia as a CPC145 due to its 
“particularly severe violations of religious freedom.”146 Perhaps the 
inclusion of Saudi Arabia as a CPC—despite its continuing value to 
the United States as an ally in the war on terror—indicates a step 
towards the inclusion of extreme violators of religious liberty as 
CPCs despite economic or strategic interests the United States may 
otherwise have in those violating countries.147 Such a step would 
concomitantly indicate actual enforcement of IRFA.  
Unfortunately, the State Department chose not to include other 
countries that the Commission had recommended for the CPC list. 
In February 2004, the Commission wrote to Secretary of State Colin 
Powell to recommend that eleven countries be designated as CPCs. 
It identified six countries not previously designated by the U.S. 
government: Eritrea, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, 
and Vietnam.148 Finally, the State Department redesignated the five 
countries that were designated the previous year and also designated 
three additional countries: Eritrea, Saudi Arabia and Vietnam. India, 
Pakistan, and Turkmenistan again evaded such designation. 
7. A cumulative assessment of the reports 
Viewing the annual reports collectively, it is possible to make 
three observations. First, the reports remain a substantial source of 
information on conditions of religious freedom around the world; 
they are very useful in highlighting the most significant violations of 
this right and in maintaining religious freedom’s prominent position 
on the foreign policy agenda. In addition, the State Department’s 
annual reports are very instructive for measuring the United States’ 
 144. Noting the omission of Iraq from the list of CPCs, the executive summary states 
that “[i]n keeping with State Department precedent, we do not report on our own governance 
but welcome the scrutiny of other responsible reporters.” 2004 INTRODUCTION, supra note 
142. In June 2004, the secretary acted to remove Iraq´s designation as a CPC. The 
Transitional Administrative Law in Iraq, ratified in March 2004, included provisions for 
freedom of religion, including the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religious 
beliefs and practice. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. 2004 Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious 
Freedom (May 2004), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/publications/ 
currentreport/2004annualRpt.pdf. 
 148. Id. 
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progress in meeting the goals of IRFA. Two important goals of 
IRFA are the designation of CPCs and the statutory requirement to 
set forth in the annual report what steps were taken as a result of the 
CPC designation. However, in spite of the latter mandate, the State 
Department has not publicized the decisions responding to 
particularly severe violations of religious freedom in CPCs made 
pursuant to IRFA, with the exception of those actions relying on 
already existing sanctions.149 In those cases, the State Department has 
not submitted to Congress the required evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the prior actions against CPCs.  
The second observation is that the executive summaries in the 
annual reports contain lists of isolated actions that the State 
Department or others in the U.S. government have taken in order to 
underreport the policies that the State Department has adopted. 
Also, on many occasions, the annual reports do not adequately 
describe the results of the particular actions taken, such as meetings 
with foreign government officials.150  
Third, since IRFA is meant to encourage the U.S. government to 
take affirmative steps to promote religious freedom, the annual 
reports should explain how that promotion of religious freedom is 
advanced in particular countries through U.S. policies on: (1) 
foreign aid, (2) public diplomacy, and (3) participation in 
international organizations.151
 149. Although relying on preexisting sanctions may be technically permissible under the 
statute, it is an indefensible policy in the case of China and Sudan because in both countries 
the situation continues to deteriorate. See Annual Reports of the United States Commission on 
International Religious Freedom, http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/index.html. 
 150. For example, of all countries mentioned in the executive summary of the 2001 
annual report, only reports on China, Egypt, Indonesia and Vietnam attempt any kind of 
systematic explanation of U.S. policies and how the actions taken by the U.S. government 
during the reporting period further those policies. This type of explanation is absent in the 
reports where serious religious freedom violations occur, such as in Saudi Arabia, India, 
Pakistan, Nigeria, Sudan, and Laos, with whom the U.S. has diplomatic relations. See 2002 
Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (May 2002), 
available at http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/publications/currentreport/2002report.pdf. In 
the same way, the Commission points out in the 2003 annual report that of the thirty-three 
countries mentioned in the executive summary of that annual report, only the reports on 
China, Egypt, Indonesia, and Vietnam attempt any kind of systematic explanation of U.S. 
policies; meanwhile, this explanation is notably absent in the reports on India, Laos, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan (all countries with whom the U.S. keeps 
diplomatic relations). See 2003 Annual Report of the United States Commission on International 
Religious Freedom, supra note 133. 
 151. See the 2002, 2003, and 2004 Annual Reports of the U.S. Commission on 
International Religious Freedom, http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/index.html. 
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IV. THE MAIN CRITICISMS LEVIED AGAINST IRFA 
The United States’ decision to unilaterally use its power to 
promote international religious freedom in an unprecedented 
manner provoked criticism both at home and abroad.152 Domestic 
reactions to the proposed legislation contained in IRFA have been 
harsh since its conception.153 As mentioned above, many religious 
and human rights groups refused to support legislation establishing 
the United States as “the religious police of the world” or as a 
“moral watchdog.”154 Also, the “potential economic consequence[s] 
attached to imposing” economic or diplomatic sanctions led some 
domestic critics to accuse the United States of being a “global 
busybody.”155 They claimed that the United States’ “religious 
freedom advocacy ha[d] nothing to do with the ‘vital strategic or 
economic interests’ of the United States and that it frustrated the 
separation between church and state.”156
The State Department considered some initial criticisms of the 
first two annual reports in drafting the third annual report.157 
However, critics continued to assail IRFA on numerous points.158 
This section will discuss four of the most salient, recurring, and valid 
criticisms. 
 152. See Peter Danchin, supra note 35; Matthew L. Sandgren, Extending Religious 
Freedom Abroad: Difficulties experienced by minority religions, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
251 (2001); Starr, supra note 62; Michael Young, External Monitoring of Domestic Religious 
Liberties, 1998 BYU L. REV. 501. Some of the strongest criticism of IRFA came from abroad, 
predominantly from Muslim countries. See Matthew L. Fore, Shall Weigh Your God and You: 
Assessing the Imperialistic Implications of the International Religious Freedom Act in Muslim 
Countries, 52 DUKE L.J. 423 (2002). 
 153. See supra Part II. 
 154. See Rns, Religious Freedom Act Gets Wide Acclaim, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Nov. 
1998, at 1015.  
 155. Starr, supra note 62, at 1010. 
 156. Id. at 1009–10. 
 157. See 2001 Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 
supra note 89. 
 158. See, e.g., Danchin, supra note 35, at 103–15 (criticizing unilateral approach of 
IRFA); Mendez, supra note 123, at 401 (arguing that taking responsibility for some of the 
human rights disasters in the report will increase U.S. credibility abroad); David M. Smolin, 
Exporting the First Amendment?: Evangelism, Proselytism, and the International Religious 
Freedom Act, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 685 (2001) (arguing that the United States should not export 
its beliefs on freedom of religion through IRFA); Wales, supra note 22, at 643–45 (stating that 
the United States should be honest in its reporting of violations and disregard political 
concerns when designating countries as CPCs). 
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The first criticism of IRFA is that it promotes a particular 
understanding of freedom of religion that is based on American ideas 
of separation of church and state and that does not conform to the 
histories, traditions, and cultures of other societies.159 By advocating 
the “universal principles” underlying religious freedom, IRFA 
provokes strong opposition among offending countries. This 
opposition is rooted in IRFA’s perceived failure to recognize the 
necessary intertwining of freedom of religion and belief with each 
country’s particular identity, traditions, and culture. Aware of this 
flaw, the executive summary in both the 2002 and 2003 annual 
reports asserts that the reports should consider the effects of history, 
culture, and tradition when analyzing religious freedom in foreign 
countries.160
Despite these attempts to take into account the background of 
other countries in the reports, foreign critics still perceive IRFA as a 
uniquely American document. The authors of IRFA took care to 
avoid this problem: while IRFA praised “the domestic protection of 
freedom of religion that ‘undergirds the very origin and existence of 
the United States,’” it did not identify the First Amendment as the 
source of that protection worldwide.161 On the contrary, IRFA cited 
the international human rights instruments as the guiding norms by 
which the act should proceed.162 Thus, IRFA itself does not maintain 
as its basis the United States’ definition of religious freedom; rather, 
it consciously chose the definition of religious freedom accepted by 
the international community. Despite these efforts, problems 
nevertheless arise with its implementation because IRFA is 
interpreted and implemented by a U.S. commission whose members 
are appointed by the U.S. government. Thus it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for IRFA not to be influenced by the American historical 
experience regarding freedom of religion.163
 159. This criticism is reinforced by the fact that many of the early supporters of IRFA 
were reacting against persecutions of Christians. Arab-American and American Muslim 
opposition to IRFA was based on the clear signs of ideological bias in the rhetoric of the 
legislation. See Fore, supra note 152, at 448. 
 160. See 2002 REPORT, supra note 125; 2003 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 129; 
Young, supra note 152, at 506.  
 161. See Craig B. Mousin, Standing with the Persecuted: Adjudicating Religious Asylum 
Claims After the Enactment of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 2003 BYU L. 
REV. 541, 542 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(1) (2000)). 
 162. See 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(3).  
 163. A good example is the comparison between American and international attitudes 
toward religious psychic injury. Smolin states, 
7RELANO.FIN 9/13/2005 3:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
740 
                                                                                                          
The second main criticism of IRFA is that the United States 
affords religious freedom greater importance than other human 
rights. Danchin argues that “IRFA, by isolating one right and 
developing special machinery by which to protect it, has created an 
irrational hierarchy of human rights in U.S. foreign policy with 
religious freedom at the apex.”164 Gunn counters, however, that 
while many of the people responsible for preparing the annual 
reports feel strongly about religious freedom, “IRFA and the 
Department of State do not assert that religion is the most important 
human right, nor do they emphasize the importance of religious 
freedom to exclude other rights.”165
Despite Gunn’s reassurances, IRFA has indirectly contributed to 
the creation of a hierarchy of human rights within the United States’ 
foreign policy. The United States discriminately implements human 
rights by investing enormous legislative efforts to promote the 
freedom of religion abroad while undermining other human rights 
within its own borders.166 In addition, the United States has taken 
 
American law gives no protection to the religious feelings of individuals in 
relationship to non-governmental hate speech, blasphemy, or expression that 
demeans or desecrates their religion. . . . Paradoxically, however, American 
constitutional law is hyper-sensitive toward psychic injury that may be caused by 
gently pro religious speech in certain contexts: particularly public schools. 
. . . . 
The approach of other nations to religious psychic injury is often quite different. 
The punishment of blasphemy expresses an interest of the society in not allowing 
the religion fundamental to social order to be publicly desecrated or indecently 
mocked. . . . On the other hand, government is often permitted to openly espouse 
religious beliefs and values, even within public schools.  
Smolin, supra note 158, at 697–98. 
 164. See Danchin, supra note 35, at 104 (emphasis added).  
 165. See Gunn, supra note 16, at 856–57 (emphasis added). Assistant Secretary of State 
John Shattuck did acknowledge these dangers in a prior version of the bill that eventually 
became IRFA. He stated during a committee hearing on an initial version of the bill that  
the legislation would create a de facto hierarchy of human rights violations under 
U.S. law that would severely damage our efforts to ensure that all aspects of basic 
civil and political rights, including freedom or religion, are protected. It would 
differentiate between acts motivated by religious discrimination and similar acts 
based on other forms of repression or bias. 
Hearing on Freedom From Religious Persecution Act of 1997, Part I Before the H. Comm. On 
Int’l Relations, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of John Shattauck, Asst. Sec. of State), 
available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa44976.000/ 
hfa44976_0.htm.  
 166. For example, the Bush administration has amended federal criminal procedure and 
immigration laws to authorize racial and religious profiling, secret detentions and immigration 
hearings, and prolonged arbitrary detention. See Fain, supra note 5, at 616–29; Mendez, supra 
note 123, at 383–85.  
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measured and deliberate steps through IRFA to protect the 
international freedom of religion while neglecting to sign other 
international human rights instruments.167 Even if IRFA is largely 
ineffective in achieving its expressed goals, its very presence on the 
international landscape serves as an emphatic assertion that the 
United States supports religious freedom to a greater extent than 
those other rights for which the United States has established no 
such presence. By protecting religious freedom abroad, at least 
nominally in the form of IRFA, but refusing to take similar actions 
on behalf of other human rights, the United States’ implicitly 
elevates religious freedom above other important rights.  
Third, the actual enforcement of IRFA is deeply flawed. The 
Wolf-Specter bill, IRFA’s precursor, would have automatically 
imposed sanctions on countries with a high record of religious 
persecution.168 As has been shown, the threat of such an automatic 
imposition generated strong opposition from various groups.169 
Unlike Wolf-Specter, IRFA does not impose automatic sanctions.170 
The language of the Act does not contain the word “sanction” but 
“action.”171 It provides the President with a menu of fifteen 
enumerated “presidential actions.”172 Numbers nine to fifteen on the 
list are specifically addressed to those countries classified as CPCs.173 
Rather than resulting in the “automatic” imposition of sanctions that 
 167. See, e.g., Sarah Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 
YALE L.J. 1, 69, 69 (2001); Fain, supra note 5, at 608–11; Mendez, supra note 123, at 389–
90. It is important to note that the United States’ efforts to combat international religious 
persecution through IRFA are no less important than the United Nations’ efforts to reduce 
race discrimination and protect the rights of women and children. Each of these human rights 
has merit and deserves protection. However, in expending enormous effort on behalf of one 
right to the exclusion of others, such a hierarchy is inevitably created. 
 168. See Gunn, supra note 16, at 857.  
 169. See id. The National Council of Churches opposed the Wolf-Specter bill because it 
imposed automatic sanctions. See Eleonora Giddings Ivory, Religious Freedom Bill Revised, 
Washington Report to Presbyterians, vol. 20, no. 2 (March/April 1998). See also supra notes 
20-21, 25-26, 29-31 and accompanying text. For the Clinton Administration’s position on 
sanctions, see Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. (July 1 1998) 
(testimony of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Sec. of State), available at http://www.un.int/ 
usa/99eiz71.htm.  
 170. The principal supporters of the Wolf-Specter bill were strongly opposed to IRFA 
because, in part, it did not include sufficient sanctions provisions. See Jeremy Gunn, American 
Exceptionalism and Globalist Double Standards: A More Balanced Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 137, 142 (2002). 
 171. 22 U.S.C. § 6445(a) (2000).  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. § 6442(c)(1)(A). 
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Wolf-Specter threatened, actions taken under IRFA have been very 
limited, if existent at all. As this Article’s analysis of the presidential 
actions taken by the United States against countries classified as 
CPCs has shown, except for Burma—which has little to offer the 
United States in terms of either economic or strategic value and has 
consequently felt the brunt of U.S. sanctions abroad—IRFA has not 
been used to impose sanctions on CPCs.174
Inherent in this criticism is that IRFA has been enforced in an 
uneven and selective manner.175 Until the 2004 report, each of the 
previous annual reports excluded “egregious violators of religious 
freedom such as Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.”176 
Despite the ongoing severe violations in Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan,177 these countries have still not been classified as 
CPCs.178 Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, and Israel, meanwhile, have all 
received “considerable development, training, educational and 
exchange cooperation, and support” despite their continued 
violations of religious freedom.179
This deferential application of presidential actions180 
“exacerbate[s] the impression of U.S. manipulation of the rhetoric of 
human rights to serve its own political purposes.”181 Many in the 
 174. See supra Part III.B.1–7. Ironically, one of the harshest criticisms of IRFA is that the 
“United States has used it as a guise to impose punitive sanctions.” See Danchin, supra note 
35, at 113–15.  
 175. See Danchin, supra note 35, at 113-15; see also, Cleveland, supra note 167, at 74–
75; Mendez, supra note 123, at 394–97.  
 176. Danchin. supra note 35, at 113; see also, Wales, supra note 22, at 638.  
 177. See Kelly, supra note 124, at 481 (discussing violations in Turkmenistan and 
admonishing the administration to list Turkmenistan as a CPC); McCormick, supra note 28, at 
299–300, 306–09 (listing violations in Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia).  
 178. Saudi Arabia was added to the list of CPCs in the 2004 Introduction. See 2004 
INTRODUCTION supra note 142.  
 179. Danchin, supra note 35, at 113.  
 180. The enforcement of IRFA through economic actions or “sanctions” is not unusual 
or illegal. The Unites States has used sanctions and executive orders against the Republics of 
Serbia and Montenegro for continuing to repress ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and against India 
and Pakistan for violations of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994. See William M. 
McGlone & Timothy P. Trenkle, Economic Sanctions and Export Control, 33 INT’L LAW. 257, 
261 (2001). Additionally, such measures comply with customary international law and the 
U.N. Charter. See Cleveland, supra note 167, at 49–52 (noting neither the U.N. Charter nor 
customary international law bar unilateral economic measures to promote human rights 
compliance). 
 181. Danchin, supra note 35, at 141; see also, Mendez supra note 123, at 393. Mendez 
explains, 
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international community believe that the United States has ignored 
human rights violations, even including religious violations, since the 
September 11th attacks, choosing instead to fight the war on 
terror.182 Although U.S. rhetoric may strongly support religious 
freedom, actual enforcement inevitably yields to the United States’ 
other foreign and domestic interests. 
Finally, the fourth criticism of IRFA challenges the legitimacy of 
the United States acting unilaterally in the promotion of 
international religious freedom.183 Through IRFA, the United States 
has unilaterally monitored freedom of religion in other nations as 
part of its foreign, political, and economic relations.184 While IRFA is 
a unilateral mechanism, however, its language does not exclude 
bilateral and multilateral measures. In fact, IRFA actually 
recommends multilateral actions and contact with non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and religious groups.185 Furthermore, the Act 
encourages the United States to negotiate and enter into bilateral 
agreements with countries that violate religious freedom prior to 
taking any presidential actions.186 As attested to by the leniency 
afforded to violating nations that double as valuable U.S. allies, 
however, the language of IRFA and the way that it is actually applied 
can diverge dramatically. IRFA may encourage multi-lateral measures, 
but if the United States applies IRFA unilaterally—intentionally or 
not—IRFA’s actual language is rendered moot.  
A related concern is the effectiveness of achieving religious 
freedom through this form of unintentional unilateral pressure.187 
Literature on the use of economic sanctions against nations such as 
 
The risk is therefore high that human rights will be used only when convenient to 
other interests; the fear is that they will be put aside when they are thought to be in 
conflict with the “national interest of the U.S.,” however vaguely defined; and that 
they will be rhetorically twisted and manipulated to serve as an argument for policies 
abroad that bear little resemblance to human rights promotion and protection. 
 Id.  
 182. See, e.g., Marjorie Cohn, Human Rights: Casualty of the War on Terror, 25 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 317 (2003); Fain, supra note 5, at 613–26; Mendez, supra note 123, at 
378–82, 392–94.  
 183. See Danchin, supra note 35, at 73.  
 184. See generally Wales, supra note 22, at 598–642 (describing the 1999–2001 reports).  
 185. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6401(b)(4); 6414; 6435a(a) (2000); Gunn, supra note 170, at 
147–48.  
 186. See id. §§ 6441(b)(1)(B), (c)(1)(C); 6442(c)(2); 6445(c). 
 187. See, e.g., Danchin, supra note 35, at 115–18 (arguing that the unilateral approach 
may do more harm than good). But see Cleveland, supra note 167, at 4–7, 87 (arguing that 
unilateral sanctions are an important aspect of a multi-tiered approach). 
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Iraq or Cuba reveals that the most vulnerable segment of the 
population—often the same segment affected by the violations that 
trigger the sanctions—is the one affected by such policies.188 Given 
this counterproductive result, it would be necessary to redefine the 
sanctions to be applied as what are known as “smart sanctions.”189 
“Smart sanctions” are sanctions that narrowly target decision makers 
and that do not permit the decision makers to shift the burden of 
sanctions to the general population. “Smart sanctions” could include 
measures such as freezing the assets of abusive leaders or 
governments and denying visas and residency permits to such 
officials. 190
V. SOLUTIONS 
All things considered, with the passage of IRFA, the United 
States created more problems than it solved. In an effort to promote 
religious liberty around the world, the United States instead exposed 
its fondness of unilateralism and its predisposition to focus only on 
economic and strategic concerns rather than on human rights and 
freedom of religion. To alleviate these negative externalities of IRFA, 
this Article proposes a number of solutions that will allow the United 
States to be an active and forceful player in the expansion of religious 
liberty across the globe without the negative effects currently 
associated with IRFA. 
First, the language in IRFA demonstrates the objective to 
motivate a multinational effort to enforce international religious 
freedom; indeed, IRFA is based upon international human rights 
documents. This objective, as expressed in the language of IRFA, 
must be attained. The United States needs to fully recognize and 
utilize IRFA as an international act with international applications. 
 188. See Danchin, supra note 35, at 115. But see McCormick, supra note 28, at 329 
(noting the lack of evidence that sanctions will harm persecuted minorities more than they are 
already being harmed).  
 189. See generally Peter L. Fitzgerald, Managing “Smart Sanctions” Against Terrorism 
Wisely, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 957, 960–62 (2002). Fitzgerald explained, “Blacklisting 
particular individuals and entities is at the heart of smart sanctions . . . [by] narrowly targeting 
the controls at the individual or entity concerned. This level of precision is becoming 
increasingly important as concern mounts over the humanitarian costs on innocent civilian 
populations of broader . . . sanctions.” Id. at 960–61. But see Molly Beutz, Functional 
Democracy: Responding to Failures of Accountability, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 387, 420–21 (2003) 
(noting that smart sanctions do not always work).  
 190. See Kenneth Roth, Testimony Before Senate Task Force on Economic Sanctions 
(September 8, 1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/press98/sept/sanct909.htm.  
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As has been discussed above, the enforcement of IRFA has been 
primarily unilateral.191 In order to prevent this tendency, the United 
States must try to reach a binding agreement with the country found 
to be a religious freedom violator, thereby encouraging additional 
consultations with other foreign governments “for purposes of 
achieving a coordinated international policy on actions that may be 
taken with respect to an offending country.”192 Furthermore, the 
United States should petition for and accept the assistance of the 
international community in protecting religious freedom so that it 
does not act as the moral police of the world. Moreover, the 
assistance of the international community would engage the United 
States in serious discussions with the international community 
regarding the international standard of religious freedom and would 
concomitantly take into account the manner in which the identity, 
history, traditions, and culture of a nation shape its meaning of 
religious freedom. 
Second, in order to answer criticisms that the United States is 
acting as the moral police of the world, IRFA should include a self-
assessment of the status of religious freedom within U.S. borders. 
The United States should effectively add itself to the list of nations 
examined in the annual reports and the Report of the Commission 
on International Religious Freedom. In so doing, the United States 
can demonstrate that rather than imposing its own unique concept 
of religious freedom abroad, it is instead assuring the maintenance of 
international standards worldwide and even at home. IRFA is 
incapable of inspiring legitimacy and validity in the international 
arena if the United States applies different standards at home and 
abroad to violations of religious freedom.193
Finally, the United States must be consistent and exceedingly 
cautious in applying sanctions. The marked differences in applying 
sanctions have led critics to stress that U.S. policies for imposing 
sanctions, far from being motivated by respect for international 
norms, instead reflect the whims of U.S domestic politics. 
Consequently, as more significant U.S. economic, security, and 
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 200–07.
 192. See Starr, supra note 62, at 1006. 
 193. Former Ambassador Seiple has criticized the Unites States for its failure to do a self-
assessment: “It suggests an inclination to report only on others, refraining from any sort of 
self-criticism.” See Robert Seiple, Religious Liberty: How Are We Doing?, CHRISTIANITY 
TODAY, Oct. 22, 2001, at 99. 
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strategic interests develop, less substantive actions will be taken 
under IRFA. The United States should look to sanction all rogue 
states, including even its allies in the war on terrorism. However, the 
United States should hesitate to impose sanctions where the life or 
livelihoods of religious minorities will be threatened as a result of 
sanctions. Any sanction should be subject to a congressional report 
with a detailed justification.  
IRFA is not terminally flawed. Rather, many of the difficulties 
stem from the enforcement of IRFA and not from the language of 
the Act itself. By adopting the suggested changes, it is possible that 
the United States can more effectively achieve its laudable goal of 
assuring religious freedom around the world.
